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COMMENT
TORTS-RELEASE-Release of One Tort-Feasor Not a Release of
Others When Tort-Feasors Are Independent and Successive
Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320, 502
P.2d 87 (1972).
INTRODUCTION
The legal consequence that inheres in finding two or more
wrongdoers to be joint tort-feasors' has long been a vexatious area
for the courts and a popular topic for legal writers. Once "joint-
ness" is established, any or all of the following ramifications may
ensue: (1) joinder of defendants in the same action is possible; (2)
each wrongdoer is liable for the entire damages of the injured
party; (3) satisfaction of a judgment against one releases all; (4)
no contribution is permitted between the joint tort-feasors (unless
changed by statute); or (5) a release of one releases all.2 This last
result, the effect of a release, has experienced a particularly ago-
nizing evolution in this country. The relatively harsh common
law rule which required that a release of one joint tort-feasor was
a release of all3 has been attacked, modified, and finally, in great
part, abrogated in favor of a seemingly more just rule.
According to Dean Prosser, a release is "a surrender of the
cause of action, which may be gratuitous, or given for inadequate
consideration." 4 This definition itself has contributed to some of
the problems with the law of releases.' Where there are multiple
wrongdoers and the victim's cause of action is "extinguished,"
i.e., surrendered, by the release of one, a doctrinaire jurist, histor-
ically, would have a difficult time letting the plaintiff proceed
with his case when theoretically it had virtually disappeared into
thin air.
This comment reviews the evolution of the law of releases in
Colorado and examines what appear to be contradictory
developments in analogous situations: Colorado's abrogation of
'Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF, L. REV. 413 (1937).
'1d. at 422-25.
:'See, .g., Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 42, 298 P.2d 957, 959 (1956); Pinkham Lumber
Co. v. Woodland State Bank, 156 Wash. 117, 131, 286 P. 95, 100 (1930); 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 711 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 301
(4th ed. 1971).
'W. PROSSER, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
VId. at 301-03.
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the common law rule of releases in Sanchez v. George Irvin Chev-
rolet, Inc.,' contrasted with its continued application of the com-
mon law rule in recent cases of medical malpractice.
I. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
As mentioned above, the effect to be given a release where
there are joint tort-feasors has not escaped theoretical confusion.
The common law rule was based, in part, on the notion that since
there was but a single cause of action against both tort-feasors, a
release as to one of them extinguished the cause of action itself
and necessarily protected the others.7 Although the elements of
jointness never seem to have been too clear, once the label was
attached the courts have had no difficulty reaching a conclusion.
The potential for hardship is apparent. Any time the unwitting
victim of multiple wrongdoers released one of them for what
seemed to him to be a roughly pro-rata share of his damages, the
victim later discovered that he was foreclosed from collecting the
balance of his damages from the other wrongdoers.
The courts have justified the common law rule with such
legal flyswatters as proximate cause,' avoidance of double recov-
ery by greedy plaintiffs,9 the single cause of action fiction, 10 and
others. Fortunately, the common law rule has been discarded to
a great extent in most jurisdictions by statutes abolishing or se-
verely weakening the common law rule," by considering the in-
tent of the parties, regardless of the form of the instrument,'2 and
by construing what appears to be a release as a covenant not to
sue.':
3
'31 Colo. App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972).
'See, e.g., Cocke v. Jennor, 1614 Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214, 215 (K.B. 1614); Duck v.
Mayeu, [1892] 2 Q.B. 511, 513; W. PROSSER, supra note 3; Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 407
(1960).
'See, e.g., Poltera v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334, 335 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971), cert. denied,
Oct. 26, 1971 (not selected for official publication).
'See, e.g., Lamoreux v. San Diego & Ariz. E. Ry., 48 Cal. 2d 617, 624, 311 P.2d 1, 5
(1957) (dictum).
"'See note 7 supra.
"See, e.g., N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW §§ 15-101 to -107 (McKinney 1964); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); Baer, Effect of Release Given Tortfeasor Causing
Initial Injury in Later Action for Malpractice Against Treating Physician, 40 N.C.L. REV.
88 (1961); see also 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414, 1416 n.9 (1959) for a list of jurisdictions with
such statutory enactments.
"See, e.g., Jukes v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 181 Kan. 12, 20, 309 P.2d 692,
699 (1957); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 125, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (1954); see also
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 403, 425 (1960) for a collection of cases on this point.
"McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 358-
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The strict common law rule and the seemingly protracted
period of change can be attributed, at least in part, to a rather
serious and prolonged confusion in the courts between a release
and satisfaction. 4 It is said that "[a] satisfaction is an accept-
ance of a full compensation for the injury."'" As indicated above,
a release could be gratuitous or given for inadequate considera-
tion. 1 A release, therefore, did not necessarily mean the claimant
was satisfied in fact, but since a release at common law was a
sealed instrument which, by definition, dispelled any questions
as to the adequacy of the consideration, 7 the courts mistakenly
considered a release to be for full compensation." Although the
efficacy of the sealed instrument waned, the confusion in the
courts persisted in the form of the so-called presumption of full
satisfaction.
One of the simplest ways for the courts to avoid the common
law rule is to find that the tort-feasors are independent, concur-
rent, successive, or any other similarly expressive classification
other than joint. This avenue is appealing in that it circumvents
the centuries of fictions and mysteries that have grown up around
joint tort-feasors. Some courts have, in fact, made use of this
distinction. 9 The simplicity of the logic is attractive, and, indeed,
as to independent wrongdoers, not acting in concert, who were
liable for the same loss, there seems to be no reason to conclude that
a release of one would release the others, except insofar as it was
based upon actual satisfaction of the claim.20
As attractive as this path is, it is not totally free from haz-
ards. The obvious question is: Who are joint and who are indepen-
dent tort-feasors? Harper and James feel that if construed
strictly, "the words 'joint tort' should be used only where the
behavior of two or more tort-feasors is such as to make it proper
59, 146 A.2d 665, 668-69 (1958). A covenant not to sue, unlike a release, does not release
any of the tort-feasors. Instead of extinguishing the cause of action, it is an agreement not
to enforce it against one or more of the wrongdoers; the cause continues to exist and is
enforceable against the nonparty tort-feasors.
"W. PROSSER, supra note 3.
1:Id.
"See text accompanying note 4 supra.
'7S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 333A (Rev. ed. 1936).
"SW. PROSSER, supra note 3.
"Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Ash v. Mor-
tensen, 24 Cal.2d 654, 657, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944); Valles v. Union Pac. R.R., 72 Idaho
231, 238-39, 238 P.2d 1154, 1159-60 (1951).
'W. PROSSER, supra note 3.
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to treat the conduct of each as the conduct of the others as well."',
In an early work," Dean Prosser notes that there have been sev-
eral tests for "jointness," ' but that the cases in which he found
them "[lead] to the conclusion that 'joint tort-feasor' means
radically different things to different courts, and often to the
same court." 4 Although he may be correct, his conclusion can
only lead to the further conclusion that to establish independence
the practitioner's approach must be as broad-based as possible in
order to square with the court's attitude on any given day. The
most felicitous approach would seem to be an exclusionary one.
Rather than casting about for a positive rule of law to show inde-
pendence, one ought to guide the court in scrutinizing the actors
under each of the traditional tests for jointness (concert of action,
common plan, etc.) while pointing out the differences. The more
tests the tort-feasors fail, the more likely independence will be
conclusively established. Whatever the method, the literature
taken as a whole shows a definitive trend away from the original
common law rule in all jurisdictions, albeit to varying degrees.
II. COLORADO DEVELOPMENT
Colorado has been a long and faithful adherent to the com-
mon law rule that a release of one joint tort-feasor releases all."
In fact, in 1959, at the time when most other jurisdictions were
in the process of reexamining the old rule, 6 the Colorado Su-
preme Court held, in Price v. Baker," that a covenant not to sue
had exactly the same effect as a general release and that it was
the legal effect, not the intent of the parties, that was the control-
21 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, at 692.
2 Prosser, supra note 1.
"They include:
"ITIhe identity of a cause of action against each of two or more defendants;
the existence of a like, or common duty; whether the same evidence will
support an action against each; the single, indivisible nature of the injury
to the plaintiff; identity of the facts as to time, place and result; whether
the injury is direct and immediate, rather than consequential; responsibility




"Ashley v. Roche, 163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967); Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39,
298 P.2d 957 (1956); Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943); Denver &
R.G.R.R. v. Sullivan, 21 Colo. 302, 41 P. 501 (1895).
2 See 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414 (1959) for a review of the various approaches.
2143 Colo. 264, 352 P.2d 90 (1959). See also 37 DICTA 121 (1960) and 33 RoCKY MTN.
L. REv. 127 (1960).
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ling element." Recently, however, the Colorado courts have
evinced a change of heart. In 1969, the supreme court finally gave
credence to a covenant not to sue and began circumventing the
common law rule by way of the "intent" approach. 9 Even more
encouraging, the court has recently held that a written instru-
ment whereby a plaintiff agrees not to object to the motion to
dismiss of some of the defendants will not affect the plaintiff's
rights as to the remaining tort-feasors, and the intent of the par-
ties will be given the same effect as if it were a pure covenant not
to sue.: This holding would seem to point toward adoption by the
Colorado courts of the "construction of releases as covenants not
to sue" approach; that is, construing an instrument, whatever its
appearance, in such a way that the plaintiff's rights are most fully
protected and preserved. Indeed, were it not for the medical mal-
practice situation where the Colorado courts have not budged,'
they would appear to have joined the majority jurisdictions in the
space of three or four short years. By examining a case which is
representative of Colorado's attitude in many release situations,
the inconsistency in the malpractice area becomes evident.
III. Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet
2
Rufina Sanchez, the plaintiff, bought a new car from the
defendant, George Irvin Chevrolet. Under the terms of the con-
tract, the defendant had agreed to secure insurance coverage for
the plaintiff. When Mrs. Sanchez sought insurance payment
through Irvin for a broken windshield she was informed that the
defendant had failed to acquire coverage for her, and she was
denied reimbursement for the loss. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. San-
chez' automobile was involved in a collision and her car was taken
to the defendant for repairs. While the car was in the defendant's
custody, the rear wheels and tires were stolen, and the windshield
was broken again. The defendant completed repairs on the car
but refused to return it to the plaintiff until the $954.46 bill
(which included the cost of wheels and tires) was paid. The plain-
tiff was allegedly unable to pay the bill and was forced to rent a
1143 Colo. at 265, 352 P.2d at 91.
"Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 73-74, 450 P.2d 60, 67 (1969).
"Farmer's Elevator Co. v. Morgan, 172 Colo. 545, 474 P.2d 617 (1970).
:"When the second tort-feasor is an allegedly negligent physician, the Colorado courts
continue to hold that the release of the first wrongdoer thereby protects the doctor. Title
v. Freed, 515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication); Poltera
v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
:'131 Colo App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972).
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car. Three months later, Mrs. Sanchez settled with the owner-
driver of the other car involved in the collision and signed a gen-
eral release from liability in his favor. She subsequently paid the
repair bill and recovered possession of her automobile. She then
brought an action against the defendant to recover the amounts
which she had paid for the stolen wheels and tires, the broken
windshield, and the cost of the rental car on the basis of defen-
dant's alleged negligence. On the defendant's motion, the trial
court granted summary judgment as to all amounts except the
cost of the original windshield on the grounds that the defendant
was protected, as a matter of law, by the release of the earlier tort-
feasor. However, the judgment was reversed and remanded by the
Colorado Court of Appeals which held that, where a plaintiff's
claim involves distinct and separate injuries caused by indepen-
dent successive tort-feasors, a release of one tort-feasor does not
serve to release all unless the evidence discloses an intent to do
so. 3
The court dealt first with Sams v. Curfman34 and Ashley v.
Roche,35 on which the trial court relied in granting summary judg-
ment. These cases involved original wrongdoers and subsequently
negligent physicians responsible for aggravation of the victims'
injuries. In both it was held that a general release as to the first
tort-feasors shielded the doctor from liability. The theory was
that the first tort-feasor was the proximate cause of the later
aggravation, presumably because the result was reasonably fore-
seeable. From this the courts reasoned that once the injured party
settled with the original wrongdoer, full compensation was pre-
sumed and there was no longer any cause for concern." In
Sanchez, the court pointed out that the presumption of full com-
pensation, which in any event is rebuttable, did not come into
play because of the nature of plaintiffs claim. The claim involved
"distinct and separate injuries" caused by "independent succes-
sive tort-feasors." '37 The release, therefore, was effective only as to
the first tort-feasor who was a party to it unless "the evidence
discloses an intent to release both. ' '3
"Id. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
:1111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
1'163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967).
"See text accompanying notes 7-10 supra.
'731 Colo. App. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
:1Id.
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The court next cited Prosser's law review article,39 which had
been quoted with approval in Bayers v. W 0. W., Inc.,40 to intro-
duce the element of actual satisfaction of the claim as the basis
for a multiparty release', and in order to determine the "joint-
ness" (or lack of it) of the actors.42 Finally, after disposing of the
major elements of the case, the court indicated that while a re-
lease such as the one here may be a defense at trial, it is not a
bar to suit as a matter of law.
The reasoning and holding in Sanchez are sound, just, and
not lacking in authority,43 and the court's emphasis of the intent
factor in the face of a general release is a proper and realistic
approach. However, in distinguishing the instant case from
Sams" and Ashley,45 the court could have dealt more forcefully
with the full compensation question. Rather than stating that the
presumption of full compensation is a rebuttable one and not
relevant to the Sanchez case (and thereby giving credence to its
very existence), the court might have been a little less delicate,
exposing the presumption as the fiction that it is and emphasiz-
ing the existence vel non of actual satisfaction from the outset.
Instead, the court relied on the "independent successive" tort-
feasors rationale found in Ash v. Mortensen.6 This case does
provide relevant language, but one wonders if the court was aware
that Ash was a malpractice case, not unlike Sams and Ashley.
The law review quotations are undoubtedly valid and appropri-
ate, with the exception that in the first-quoted material the au-
thor is talking about wrongdoers liable for the same loss and the
court had just determined that Sanchez involved separate and
distinct injuries. Although it is possible to quibble with these
citations, the court eventually reaches what seems to be the right
result. Indeed, had the opposite result been reached, "the repair-
man not only is excused from negligence, he also has a license to
"'Prosser, supra note 1.
"162 Colo. 391, 396, 426 P.2d 552, 555 (1967).
"Id. at 396, 426 P.2d at 555 (1967). " '[Als to independent wrongdoers, not acting in
concert, who were liable for the same loss, there seems to be no reason to conclude that a
release of one would release the others, except in so far as it was based upon actual
satisfaction of the claim.' " Id.
," 'The question is whether, upon the facts, it is possible to say that each defendant
is responsible for a separate portion of the loss sustained.' " Id.
"See generally W. PRossER, supra note 3.
"1ll Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
'1163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967).
4824 Cal. 2d 654, 657, 150 P.2d 876, 877 (1944).
1974
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steal because the release of the original tort-feasor follows his
every act.
47
IV. THE ANALOGY TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In Colorado, a release of one joint tort-feasor still releases a
subsequent tort-feasor who is not a party to the release if he is
an allegedly negligent physician."
The policy considerations in favor of abrogation of the com-
mon law rule in this area, besides the generally unjust and unin-
tended result it effects, are numerous and sound. The rule has
been severly criticized as harsh, unfounded, and not in accord
with the trend in other jurisdictions. 9
It has been aptly pointed out that the old rule (1) provides a
trap for the innocent plaintiff whereby he may be deprived of full
compensation, (2) allows the courts to disregard totally the
language and intent of the parties, (3) rewards the wrongdoer who
makes no attempt to settle at the expense of the one who does,
(4) gives tort-feasors an advantage inconsistent with the nature
of their liability, and (5) stifles compromise since each wrongdoer
wants to wait until the other settles first.A0
When the current trend in other jurisdictions, Colorado's
avowed denial of that trend, and the Sanchez case are considered
together, one begins to wonder if, on its facts, Sanchez is really
very different from malpractice cases like Poltera v. Garlington5'
and Title v. Freed.5 Arguably not. In Sanchez, there is an original
tort-feasor who actually inflicted the initial damage (injury).
There is a person (doctor), corporate here, to whom the automo-
bile (victim) was taken for repairs (treatment). In the course of
that repair, certain mistakes are made through the repairman's
"7Brief for Appellant at 6, Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320,
502 P.2d 87 (1972) (emphasis added).
sTitle v. Freed, 515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publica-
tion); Poltera v. Garlington, 489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official
publication).
I'DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash. 2d 357, 418 P.2d 1010 (1966); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075
(1955) (as supplemented); Note, Smith v. Conn: Effect of Release of Original Tortfeasor
as to Subsequently Negligent Physician, 6 WILLAMETTE L.J. 335 (1970); Comment, Torts:
Release of Joint and Successive Tort-Feasors in Oklahoma, 15 OKLA. L. REv. 97 (1962).
5"McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (not a malpractice case but
involving identical policy considerations).
11489 P.2d 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
12515 P.2d 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication).
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(doctor's) negligence resulting in further loss to the plaintiff. 3
In Poltera, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as the
result of an automobile collision. During the pendency of legal
proceedings against the original tort-feasor, the plaintiff was ex-
amined by a physician at the request of the first wrongdoer and
his insurer. After settling with the original tort-feasor, the plain-
tiff sought relief against the physician for his alleged negligence.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held, in response to plaintiff's
appeal from an adverse summary judgment at the trial court,
that plaintiff's action was indeed barred as a matter of law:
The law is settled in this jurisdiction that, where a person ac-
cepts a settlement for injuries with the tort-feasor who caused the
accident resulting in his or her disability and executes a formal
release from any and all causes of action, claims and demands,
damages and expenses growing out of that accident, that person
cannot thereafter recover from a physician for damages resulting
from the alleged negligent treatment of those injuries. The rationale
upon which this rule rests is that the original injuries are held to be
the proximate cause of the additional damages which result from the
purported negligence of the physician against whom recovery is
sought.54
The court of appeals expressed the identical attitude in Title.
In that case, the plaintiff suffered skull injuries in an automobile
accident. Five days after the defendant-surgeon operated on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff lost the use of his left arm. Later the plain-
tiff settled with the party responsible for the automobile accident
and executed a general release. When the plaintiff appealed from
an adverse summary judgment in his action against the doctor,
the Colorado Court of Appeals, in affirming, stated:
Under these facts Ashley v. Roche . . . and Sams v. Curfman .
are controlling. In the latter case a party injured in an accident sued
the tortfeasor, settled the case, executed a general release, and then
sued the physician for alleged negligence in his treatment of the
resultant injuries, all as in the present case. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action on the ground that
the release given in the first action released the physician because,
5'To some, the analogy may be weakened by the fact that the negligent doctor has
personally committed a physical act that has aggravated the injury while the repairman,
in a custodial capacity, has failed to act, leading to further damage. This will not be so
troublesome to the reader who considers the defendant as the law does, as a corporate
"person," and notes that the similarities in the fact situations far outweigh any possible
differences.
1'489 P.2d at 335, citing Ashley v. Roche, 163 Colo. 498, 431 P.2d 783 (1967), and Sams
v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
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"the original injuries are held to be the proximate cause of the added
damages resulting from the negligence and unskillfulness of the at-
tending physician." '
These analyses, based on proximate cause, are typical of
those used by courts applying the old common law rule. Their use
seems dangerous in the law of releases,5 and any such unfortun-
ate theory '7 ought to be used only where nothing else is avail-
able. 5  Rather than diving headlong into the quagmire of
proximate cause, one question most effectively answers the con-
flict better than volumes of precedent: Is it really more reason-
ably foreseeable that a physician, with years of formal education
and training, will be more unskilled and negligent than an auto-
mobile body shop? Framed in this manner, the conflicting results
in the cases are hard to reconcile. The visceral reaction in favor
of abrogation of the common law rule is strong indeed, but there
are other, more persuasive, arguments for an extension of
Sanchez to the Poltera and Title situations.
As has been shown, Colorado has broken with the common
law rule that a release of one joint tort-feasor releases all. This
jurisdiction seems to be leaning towards abolishing the Poltera
rule, but, to date, the development away from the old rule has
taken place in fact situations with which the courts could cope.59
Stating that the traditional rule has absolutely no efficacy may
be too dramatic a step for the Colorado courts to take, but they
may not have to do exactly that. Ash v. Mortensen0 was used by
the Sanchez court to arrive at the conclusion that they were deal-
ing with independent and successive tort-feasors and separate
and distinct claims." In Ash, the plaintiff's injuries were aggra-
vated by a negligent physician and the plaintiff had released the
1515 P.2d at 1150.
"Both counsel in Sanchez relied heavily on Poltera in their briefs to the court of
appeals. The trial court relied on two malpractice cases in granting the summary judg-
ment. It is quite possible that if the malpractice cases are allowed to remain on the books
their inevitable use in other fact situations might well lead to a revival of the old common
law rule in cases that, to date, have denied its efficacy.
5'See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 236 for an introduction to the nightmare of proxi-
mate cause.
56E.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
"'Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969), and Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc.,
162 Colo. 391, 426 P.2d 552 (1967) (both dealing with financial loss to the plaintiff);
Sanchez v. George Irvin Chevrolet Co., 31 Colo. App. 320, 502 P.2d 87 (1972) (involving
property damage).
6'24 Cal.2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
631 Colo. App. at 323, 502 P.2d at 89.
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original tort-feasor. When the physician attempted to use that
release as a defense, he was thwarted in his effort by the Califor-
nia court finding independence of the wrongdoers and holding the
release to be effective only as to the original tort-feasor. The fact
that the Sanchez court relied heavily on a malpractice case, to-
tally inconsistent with Colorado's own malpractice cases, to-
gether with the fact that the Colorado Supreme Court cited Ash
with approval in another recent release case" may well be the
ultimate bridge in the gap between the last vestiges of the com-
mon law rule in Colorado and a modern realistic approach to
releases. That is, in the next Poltera or Title, the Colorado courts
can either flatly deny the efficacy of the common law rule or, if
they prefer, find that it does not apply because the tort-feasors
are not joint. In terms of "jointness" in malpractice cases like
Poltera and Title, the problem of separability or inseparability of
the injury"3 may often arise. It may well be a hard factual ques-
tion, but it should not, as a matter of law, lead to "jointness" and
its unjust consequences. 4 Likewise, with regard to the old com-
mon law rule itself, since the identity of cause of action fiction
can be easily avoided by the technically unique (but practically
identical) covenant not to sue," its continued efficacy as a bar to
recovery in the area of releases seems at best a minor obstacle to
a new rule in Colorado.
CONCLUSION
Common sense, reported cases, and legal writers accurately
point out that the vital elements in any release situation are the
intent of the parties and the extent of actual compensation. A
plaintiff should never be barred from pursuing a second tort-
feasor by a release of the first unless, by the instrument, he in-
tended to release both or he has been so fully compensated for his
injury that he ought not to be entitled to do so. The use of Ash
by the Colorado courts more likely represents thorough analysis
and thoughtful study of a sister state's precedent than an inad-
"Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc., 162 Colo. 391, 396, 426 P.2d 552, 555 (1967).
1 Prosser, supra note 1.
"Id. at 434-35.
"Comment, Release of Joint Tort-Feasors in Texas, 36 TEX. L. REV. 55, 56 (1957).
"See, e.g., Justice Rutledge's excellent opinion in McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1943); Wecker v. Kilmer, 294 N.E.2d 132 (Ind. 1973) (a malpractice case);
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075, 1084 (1955); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1
(1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 304; Note, supra note 49; Comment, supra note 49,
at 99; 3 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1941).
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vertent extraction of appropriate language from a case in direct
conflict with Poltera. Since Poltera was not selected for official
publication, it is persuasive precedent only67 and is not, therefore,
too great a barrier in itself, to a new rule. If the rights of personal
injury victims are to be as fully preserved and protected as the
plaintiff's in Sanchez, and if medical practitioners are to be held
accountable for their negligence, hopefully, at the next
opportunity, the Colorado courts will finally lay to rest the prob-
lem raised here. Until that time, the only safe route for the cau-
tious practitioner seeking to fully protect his client's rights is to
have the victim execute a covenant not to sue 8 in favor of the
settling tort-feasor evidencing a clear intent to benefit only that
party and specifically exempting any treating physicians from its
coverage. Such a procedure, requiring technical accuracy by the
well-advised plaintiff and holding great potential injury for the
ill-advised, provides a possible escape from the harsh common
law rule of releases, but, in failing to repudiate the common law
rule completely, lays an unjustified and unfortunate trap for the
unwary.
Daniel M. Fowler
'COLO. App. R. 35(f).
"'Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 (1969); Title v. Freed, 515 P.2d 149
(Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (not selected for official publication).
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